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LA PROMESA CUMPLIDA [THE PROMISE 
FULFILLED]: HOW THE U.S. CONSTITUTION HAS 
ENABLED COLONIALISM 
Dean Delasalas 
On June 30, 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) into law to address 
Puerto Rico’s debt crisis.1  The crisis began in 2006 when Puerto Rico entered a 
recession caused by a decade-long decline in manufacturing.2  The Puerto Rican 
government subsequently laid off government employees, privatized public 
assets, and issued refinancing bonds to pay creditors.3  Those measures were 
ineffectual.  Puerto Rico has approximately 120 billion dollars in bond and 
pension debt,4 defaults on that debt,5 junk status bonds6 and, now with 
PROMESA, a government stripped of much of its autonomy. 
PROMESA was Congress’s response to Puerto Rico’s inability to resolve the 
debt crisis.  On June 28, 2014, Puerto Rico passed the Recovery Act to prevent 
creditors from invoking contractual remedies to obtain payment from public 
entities.7  However, creditors holding two billion dollars in Puerto Rican bonds 
sued Puerto Rico in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, 
arguing that the Recovery Act encroached on Congress’s power to set uniform 
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 1. Heather Long, President Obama Signs Puerto Rico Rescue Bill, CNN (June 30, 2016, 
5:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/29/investing/puerto-rico-debt-promesa/. 
 2. See generally Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: How Did We Get Here, BBC (Jan. 21, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35368786 (explaining that the 2006 recession in 
Puerto Rico was caused by the 1996 repeal of a federal tax provision that had incentivized 
manufacturers to do business in Puerto Rico). 
 3. Pirates of the Caribbean: How Santander’s Revolving Door with Puerto Rico’s 
Development Bank Exacerbated a Fiscal Catastrophe for the Puerto Rican People , HEDGE 
CLIPPERS (Dec. 13, 2016), http://hedgeclippers.org/pirates-of-the-caribbean-how-santanders-
revolving-door-with-puerto-ricos-development-bank-exacerbated-a-fiscal-catastrophe-for-the-
puerto-rican-people/#_ftnref2. 
 4. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board Grills Officials on Found Money, Years of Accounting 
Woes, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-puertorico-debt-accounti 
ng/puerto-rico-board-grills-officials-on-found-money-years-of-accounting-woes-
idUSKBN1F8294?il=0 (describing a two-hour hearing in which the Oversight Board excoriated 
Puerto Rican officials for failing to account for approximately seven billion dollars).  
 5. See Pirates of the Caribbean, supra note 3. 
 6. Claudia Assis, Moody’s Downgrades Puerto Rico’s Bonds Further into Junk, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 11, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/moodys-downgr 
ades-puerto-ricos-bonds-further-into-junk-2017-10-11. 
 7. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583–84 (D.P.R. 2015). 
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bankruptcy laws.8  On February 6, 2015, the court found for the creditors and 
enjoined Puerto Rico from enforcing the Recovery Act.9  On June 13, 2016, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, thereby precluding Puerto 
Rico from accessing relief under federal bankruptcy laws and from passing 
measures to obtain similar relief.10  Two weeks later, President Obama signed 
PROMESA into law.11 
Congress enacted PROMESA in accordance with its power under the 
Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution “to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations for territories.”12  PROMESA’s stated purpose is to help 
Puerto Rico “achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets”13 
by permitting Puerto Rico to restructure its debt in an orderly fashion.14  For 
those purposes, the PROMESA created a Financial Oversight and Management 
Board (Oversight Board)15 and prohibited Puerto Rico from “exercis[ing] any 
control, supervision, oversight, or review over the Oversight Board or its 
activities . . . .”16  The Oversight Board can cut “nondebt expenditures,”17 
prevent the enforcement of regulations it finds inconsistent with the fiscal plans 
it has approved,18 and crack down on protesting public sector employees.19 
PROMESA has provoked mixed and often vehement reactions.20  Then-
Governor Alejandro García Padilla of Puerto Rico described PROMESA as 
                                                 
 8. Id. at  584–85. 
 9. Id. at  614. 
 10. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016).  During the 
lit igation, Senator Richard Blumenthal and Representative Pedro Pier luisi of Puerto Rico 
introduced bills in Congress permitting Puerto Rican cities to access bankruptcy protection.  See 
Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015, H.R. 870, 114th Cong. (2015) (noting 
Representative Pierluisi’s Bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law without further action taken); Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity 
Act of 2015, S. 1774, 114th Cong. (2015) (noting Senator Blumenthal’s bill was read twice and 
referred to the Committee of the Judiciary without further action taken). 
 11. See Long, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 
2101–2241, 2121(b)(2) (2012). 
 13. Id. § 2121(a). 
 14. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The Fight to Relieve Puerto Rico’s Debt Is in Congress’s 
Hands, STAN. L. SCH. (June 14, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/14/the-fight-to-relieve-
puerto-ricos-debt-crisis-in-congresss-hands/. 
 15. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1). 
 16. Id. § 2128(a)(1). 
 17. Id. § 2143(d)(1). 
 18. Id. § 2144(b)(5). 
 19. Id. § 2124(h). 
 20. See, e.g., Ongoing Puerto Rico Protest Camp Blasts “Colonial” PROMESA Bill, 
T ELESUR (July 12, 2016), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Ongoing-Puerto-Rico-Protest-
Camp-Blasts-Colonial-PROMESA-Bill-20160712-0016.html (reporting on protesters against 
PROMESA who had set up tents around the U.S. Federal Court building in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 
and called PROMESA an example of “colonial dictatorship”).  See also Raul L. Reyes, Experts: 
PROMESA Act Done, Job Now Is to Keep Puerto Rico Afloat Amid Debt, NBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 
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Puerto Rico’s opportunity “to take [the] island from creditors and return it to 
the people.”21  In contrast, Padilla’s successor Ricardo Rosselló in August 2017, 
defied the Oversight Board’s demand to furlough government employees as a 
cost-saving measure and connected PROMESA back to Puerto Rico’s “unfair 
colonial condition.”22  Outside of Puerto Rico, PROMESA has alarmed officials 
in other U.S. territories who have had to assure their citizens that their own 
problems were not severe enough to warrant an oversight board.23 
On September 20, 2017, the situation worsened for Puerto Rico with the 
arrival of Hurricane Maria, the strongest hurricane to hit Puerto Rico in over 
eighty years.24  Hurricane Maria covered more than half of the island, ripping 
electrical-transmission towers out of the ground, generating torrents 
necessitating the immediate evacuation of over 70,000 people, and killing 
approximately 2,975 people.25  The death toll likely would have been higher but 
for Puerto Rico’s fortune of not having too many low -lying areas.26  In addition 
                                                 
2016, 10:41 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/experts-promesa-act-done-job-now-
keep-puerto-rico-afloat-n627181 (noting that, even in the best case scenario, PROMESA could fix 
the debt crisis, but not adequately address “overall economic growth” in Puerto Rico).  Judge Juan 
Torruella of the First Circuit denounced PROMESA as “ the ‘most humiliating, contemptuous, 
undemocratic and colonial act ever seen throughout  [Puerto Rico’s] entire relationship with the 
United States . . . .’”  Cindy Burgos Alvarado, Judge Torruella Calls for ‘Economic Boycott’ and 
‘Civil Resistance’ Against Fiscal Board, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Sept. 11, 2016), 
http://caribbeanbusiness.com/judge-torruella-requests-economic-boycott-and-civil-resistance-
against-fiscal-board/.  Judge Torruella himself faced intense criticism for also suggesting Puerto 
Ricans form a “civil resistance movement” against PROMESA’s implementation.  Eva Lloréns 
Vélez, Judge Torruella Gains Controversy over ‘Civil Resistance’ Remarks, CARIBBEAN BUS. 
(Sept. 11, 2016), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/judge-torruella-gains-controversy-over-civil-
resistance-encouragement/. 
 21. Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC 
NEWS LATINO, (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-
promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 (translating the original quote); see Reacciones 
a la Aprobación de PROMESA, EL NUEVO DÍA (June 29, 2016, 8:51 PM), 
http://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/reaccionesalaaprobaciondepromesa-2216356/ 
(“Hoy estamos recuperando al país; con la aprobación de PROMESA comenzamos a quitárselo a 
los acreedores y a devolvérselo a los puertorriqueños.” (original quote)). 
 22. Puerto Rico Governor Delivers Defying Speech After Controversial Fiscal Board 
Meeting, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Aug. 4, 2017), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/puerto-rico-governor-
delivers-speech-after-controversial-fiscal-board-meeting/. 
 23. Ernice Gilbert, VI Noosed to Bondholders as Senators Pass $247 Million Debt Financing 
Bill, T HE V. I. CONSORTIUM (Nov. 4, 2016), http://viconsortium.com/government-2/vi-noosed-to-
bondholders-as-senators-pass-247-million-debt-financing-bill/. 
 24. Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening with the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico? , T HE ATL. 
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/what -happened-in-puerto-
rico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-maria/541956/. 
 25. See generally Matthias Schwartz, Maria’s Bodies, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 22, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/hurricane-maria-man-made-disaster.html; Leyla 
Santiago et al., Puerto Rico Hurricane Maria’s Death Toll Is 46 Times Higher than the 
Government’s Previous Count, CNN (Aug. 28, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/0 
8/28/health/puerto-rico-gw-report-excess-deaths/index.html. 
 26. See Schwartz, supra note 25. 
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to the tragic loss in human life and dramatic increase in human suffering, 
Hurricane Maria has been estimated to cost the Puerto Rican people between 
forty-five billion and ninety-five billion dollars in damages.27 
Given the looming presence of the Oversight Board in Puerto Rico as Puerto 
Rico attempts to recover from both its crippling debt and the devastation of 
Hurricane Maria, it is worth examining PROMESA.  Despite the reactions 
PROMESA has provoked, PROMESA is not an aberration in constitutional law.  
Rather, PROMESA highlights a major problem in the Constitution: the virtually 
limitless power granted to Congress to regulate the Territories of the United 
States.  PROMESA is one of many examples of how Congress has wielded that 
power to treat the U.S. Territories as colonies and thereby betray the United 
States’ democratic values.28  Therefore, PROMESA is as much a warning to the 
other U.S. Territories about the constitutionality of such action as it is a wake-
up call to those who reside in the United States proper.  This concern is 
independent of PROMESA’s merits.  Perhaps PROMESA’s debt restricting 
provisions are necessary for Puerto Rico’s long-term economic survival and 
recovery.  Nonetheless, the American people should avoid exclusively focusing 
on expediency when determining what remedies to use. 
This Note will first survey the case law regarding the Territory Clause, 
focusing on two periods: the founding of the United States to the Spanish-
American War in 1898 and the Spanish-American War to the present.  Then, the 
Note will explain the current status of the territorial governments.  Afterward, 
the Note will examine the terms of PROMESA in light of the previous sections 
and connect them to precedent and current events.  Finally, the Note will discuss 
what PROMESA portends for the other U.S. Territories. 
I. PRIOR LAW: THE GROUNDWORK FOR PROMESA 
A. The Territory Clause Enables United States Colonialism 
The Territory Clause enables Congress “to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States . . . .”29  Though the Territory Clause’s text distinguishes 
between “Territory” and “property,” those terms are used interchangeably.30  
Theoretically, this interchangeability permits Congress to treat U.S. Territories 
                                                 
 27. Jill Disis, Hurricane Maria Could Be a $95 Billion Storm for Puerto Rico , CNN MONEY 
(Sept. 28, 2017, 3:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/news/economy/puerto-rico-
hurricane-maria-damage-estimate/index.html. 
 28. This Article uses the word “colony” the same way José Trías Monge, former Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, used the word “colony”: “ to denote that the United States 
unnecessarily holds excessive powers over Puerto Rico, thoughtlessly preventing it  from attaining 
a respected place on earth . . . .” JOSÉ T RÍAS MONGE, INJUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 
INSULAR CASES AND OTHER ODDITIES 233 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 30. Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1225–26 (2011). 
2018] How the U.S. Constitution Has Enabled Colonialism 765 
such as Puerto Rico as it would Howland Island,31 an uninhabited island with a 
climate the CIA describes as “scant rainfall, constant wind, [and] burning sun.”32 
As Professor Gary Lawson has noted, the Territory Clause appears “structured 
to facilitate the[] treatment [of the territories] as colonies” because it lumps the 
territories in with other U.S. property.33  The words of Gouverneur Morris, the 
drafter of the Territory Clause, lend credence to that conclusion.34  Morris 
claimed to have written the Territory Clause to enable Congress to treat the 
Territories as “provinces” with “no voice” in the federal government.35  Though 
Morris’s view may be an outlier, the Territory Clause does “place territorial self-
governance at the mercy of the national political branches . . . .”36 
In his analysis of the Territory Clause, Justice Joseph Story reaches a similar 
conclusion.  In Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Justice 
Story likens Congress’s power under the Territory Clause to the conqueror’s 
right to rule over acquired territory.37  He argues that, until Congress admits a 
territory into the Union, treaty terms and congressional action determine whether 
people in the Territories can have “the privileges, rights, and immunities” of 
United States citizens.38  Justice Story presciently wonders whether people in 
the Territories would receive such liberties “without any express stipulation,” 
but avoids answering his own question because he thought the question would 
never arise.39 
In A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution, Justice Story argues that 
Congress can impose “general regulation” over newly acquired territory.40  He 
illustrates this regulatory power with his explanation of the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787.41  Described as a “masterly display of the fundamental principles of 
civil and religious and political liberty,”42  the Northwest Ordinance enabled 
                                                 
 31. Id. at  1229. 
 32. The World Factbook Australia-Oceania: Howland Island , CIA, https://www.cia.gov/libr  
ary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hq.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2017). 
 33. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism , 78 CAL. L. REV. 
853, 908–09 (1990) (quoting a letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston on December 
4, 1803). 
 34. Id. at  908–09; see generally William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism , 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 983, 1000–01 (2009). 
 35. Lawson, supra note 33, at 908. 
 36. Id. at  909. 
 37. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (3d. 
ed 1858) [hereinafter STORY I]. 
 38. Id. at  227–28. 
 39. Id. at  228. 
 40. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONTAINING A BRIEF COMMENTARY ON EVERY CLAUSE, EXPLAINING THE T RUE 
NATURE, REASONS, AND OBJECTS T HEREOF; DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF SCHOOL LIBRARIES AND 
GENERAL READERS 138–39 (The Lawbook Exchange, 1999) [hereinafter STORY II]. 
 41. Id. at  139.  Regrettably, Justice Story spends more time on the Northwest Ordinance than 
he does on the actual text of the Territory Clause.  See id. at  139–41. 
 42. Id. at  139. 
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Congress to micromanage the northwestern Territories.43  Under it, Congress 
granted the people of the territory religious freedom, a right to trial by jury, 
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and procedural due process.44  
However, Congress appointed “all [the territorial governor’s] general officers,” 
commissioned all five members of the legislative council, and reserved the right 
to invalidate territorial laws it “disapproved of.”45 
B. The Supreme Court Has Consistently Held that Congress Has Plenary 
Regulatory Power over the Territories of the United States 
1. Pre-Spanish-American War Territory Clause Jurisprudence: 
Absolutism Toward the Territories. 
Following the path of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Territory Clause 
jurisprudence gave the federal government increasing latitude to ignore, when 
regulating the Territories, the ordinary constitutional limits on congressional 
power.46 
In 1810, in Sere v. Pitot, the Supreme Court stated the Territory Clause gave 
Congress “absolute and undisputed power of governing and legislating . . .” for 
the Territories.47  Debtors to French creditors claimed the District Court of the 
territory of Orleans could not have jurisdiction over them because they were 
citizens of a territory and therefore not citizens of a state.48  They further argued 
finding jurisdiction in the Orleans District Court would violate the Constitution’s 
restriction on Congress’s ability to extend jurisdiction to cases brought against 
the citizens of Territories.49  Unanimously, the Supreme Court rejected the 
debtors’ arguments because the Orleans District Court “must be considered as 
having such jurisdiction as [C]ongress intended to give it[,]” the Constitution’s 
limitations on jurisdiction notwithstanding.50 
In 1828, the Supreme Court deepened the dissonance between the normal 
constitutional limitations on Congress and the Territory Clause’s plenary power 
grant with its decision in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton.51  The 
                                                 
 43. This level of micromanagement is consistent with Justice Story ’s belief that territories 
were not meant to “participate in political power” or “share in the powers of the general government 
until they became a state . . . .”  STORY I, supra note 37, at 228. 
 44. See Northwest Ordinance; July 13, 1787 , YALE L. SCH. art . I–III, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).  
 45. Id. § 5–6.  As will be explained later in this Note, many have disputed Congress’s ability 
to appoint territorial officials in this manner.  See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
 46. Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336–37 (1810). 
 47. Id. at  337. 
 48. Id. at  334. 
 49. Id. at  337. 
 50. Id. at  337–38. 
 51. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828); see STORY I, supra note 37, at 228 (stating that territorial 
courts were “ in no just sense constitutional courts” and therefore “ incapable of receiving [the 
Constitution’s judicial power].”).  But see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, T HE CONSTITUTION 
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plaintiff insurance companies argued the Key West District Court in the then-
territory of Florida did not have jurisdiction over the parties because the 
Constitution prohibited Congress from “vest[ing] admiralty-jurisdiction in 
Courts created by territorial legislature.”52  However, the Supreme Court held 
the Key West District Court had jurisdiction because territorial courts, as 
“legislative Courts, created in virtue of [the Territory Clause],” did not have to 
follow the Constitution’s limits on jurisdiction.53  More importantly, the 
Supreme Court stated that “[i]n legislating for [the Territories], Congress 
exercises the combined power of the general, and of a state government.”54 
From 356 Bales of Cotton onward—with the exception of some 
aberrations55—the Supreme Court expanded the Territory Clause’s 
applications.56  In 1879, in National Bank v.  County of Yankton, the Supreme 
Court held a territory’s county could donate bonds to a railroad company, not 
because the act authorizing the donation was passed by the territorial legislature, 
signed by the governor, and voted on by the county’s citizens, but rather because 
Congress approved the act.57  In dicta, Justice Morrison Waite wrote Congress 
had “full and complete legislative authority over the people of the Territories . . 
.” and could nullify the county’s acts.58  However, he added that, regarding the 
                                                 
OF EMPIRE 146, 149 (2004) (arguing Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling on the status of territorial 
courts “ respond[ed] to an argument advanced by neither party[]” and that his ruling was “ rather 
flagrantly contrary to the clear meaning of the Constitution.”). 
 52. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–66 (1878) (stating that the First 
Amendment prohibits Congress from forbidding the free exercise of religion in the territories, but 
upholding a federal anti-bigamy statute as constitutional because Congress can regulate religious 
conduct such as religiously-mandated polygamy, not beliefs).  See also EDIBERTO ROMÁN, THE 
OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES’ NINETEENTH AND T WENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS 40–45 
(2006) (arguing three cases in the 1850s, Cross v. Harrison, Fleming v. Page, and the infamous 
Dred Scott v. Sandford opinion, are sufficient evidence the Supreme Court determined the 
Constitution applied automatically and fully to the territories); see also Juan R. Torruella, 
Outstanding Constitutional and International Law Issues Raised by the United States-Puerto Rico 
Relationship, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 79, 84–85 (2016) (asserting that, as a result of the 
“ racially charged imperialistic mania” of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court 
ignored Dred Scott’s clear limitation of the Territory Clause to “ lands held at the time of the treaty 
with Great Britain in 1783 . . . .”). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840) (“[The] power [of the Territory 
Clause] is vested in Congress without limitation . . . .”); see also Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 
235, 242 (1850) (stating territorial courts were under the “supervision and control” of Congress and 
“no[t] subject to [the Constitution’s] complex distribution of the powers of government . . . .”). 
 57. 101 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1879). 
 58. Id. at  133; see also Snow v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 317, 320 (1873) (“The 
extent of the power thus granted [to a territorial legislature] . . . is at all t imes subject to such 
alterations as Congress may see fit  to adopt.”). 
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regulation of the Territories, Congress did not have powers “expressly or by 
implication reserved in the prohibition of the Constitution.”59 
The dicta of County of Yankton became the law in Late Corp. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States.60  In 1890, the Mormon 
Church sued the United States after Congress, under the Morrill Anti-Bigamy 
Act of 1862, invalidated the charter of incorporation that the then-territory of 
Utah had given to the Mormon Church.61  The Supreme Court found for the 
United States because it was “too plain for argument” that Congress could repeal 
the charter whenever it saw fit to do so.62  Nonetheless, the majority mused, 
“Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be subject to those 
fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the 
Constitution and its amendments . . . .”63  Even so, the majority stated that such 
limitations existed “by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution . . . 
.”64 
2. Post-Spanish-American War Jurisprudence 
a. The Impact of the Insular Cases: The Constitution Does Not Always 
Follow the Flag 
The aftermath of the Spanish-American War brought up the question Justice 
Story had evaded decades prior: Did the Constitution automatically extend to 
the Territories upon annexation, or did Congress have to expressly extend the 
Constitution to the Territories?65 
In the Treaty of Paris of 1898, Spain ceded Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, 
and Guam to the United States.66  The Treaty left the “civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of the [T]erritories . . .” for Congress to 
determine.67  Scholars assumed Congress would eventually admit the Territories 
as states with all the rights the Constitution guaranteed them.68  However, the 
                                                 
 59. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. at 133. 
 60. 136 U.S. 1, 42–45 (1890) [hereinafter Mormon Church]. 
 61. Id. at  5–6. 
 62. Id. at  45.  Such a ruling was unsurprising given that, roughly a month before, the Supreme 
Court defined territories as organized entities whose powers “are conferred upon them by act of 
Congress, and [whose] legislative acts are subject to the disapproval of  the Congress of the United 
States.”  In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 447 (1890). 
 63. Mormon Church, 136 U.S. at 44. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See STORY I, supra note 37, at 227–28. 
 66. BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, T HE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AMERICAN EMPIRE 4 (Peter Charles Hoffer & N. E. H. Hull eds., 2006). 
 67. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, art . IX, 
¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. 
 68. SPARROW, supra note 66, at 4–6; see Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 4 
(1955) (“Territorial government in the continental United States was customarily viewed as a 
transition step to statehood . . . .”).  But see Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New 
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Insular Cases raised the possibility that Congress could keep the Territories as 
possessions indefinitely with no guarantee that the Constitution’s protections 
would apply to them.69 
The Insular Cases were a series of early 20th century cases that set the course 
for modern Territory Clause jurisprudence.70  A major impetus for these cases 
was the annexation of Puerto Rico.71  In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker Act 
to replace the military occupation of Puerto Rico with a new “civil 
government.”72  The Act gave Puerto Ricans an elected legislature whose laws 
Congress could freely invalidate and provided Puerto Rican citizenship.73  
Whether the Constitution extended to Puerto Rico was a question in the first two 
Insular Cases. 
These cases, De Lima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell, occurred in 1901.74  
Both involved companies suing the collector of the port of New York over a 
tariff on Puerto Rican goods.75  In De Lima, the company argued payment of the 
tariff imposed by the 1897 Dingley Act was improper because Puerto Rico was 
not a foreign country for tariff purposes.76  The Supreme Court agreed, 
considering Puerto Rico and the other overseas Territories “domestic” 
Territories for tariff purposes but excluding them from the United States.77  
Though strange, the situation was not out of the ordinary, given the long 
                                                 
Possessions—A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155, 174–76 (1899) (arguing the United States could 
hold territories as possessions unincorporated into United States and to which the Constitution 
would not apply). 
 69. SPARROW, supra note 66, at 6.  See 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON & HENRY STEELE 
COMMAGER, T HE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 341 (1950) (“The petty islands and 
guano rocks that had already been annexed had never raised, as Puerto Rico and the Philippines 
did, the embarrassing question of . . . the nature and extent of Congressional control.”). 
 70. SPARROW, supra note 66, at 4–5.  Scholars disagree about the number of cases to include 
in the Insular Cases, with the cases being as few as five or as many as thirty-five.  Compare id. at  
257 (identifying thirty-five such cases) with David M. Helfield et al., Applicability of the United 
States Constitution and Federal Laws to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico , 110 F.R.D. 449, 454 
(1985) (identifying five cases).  Though not claiming to have a definitive number, this Note 
disagrees with several of Professor Sparrow’s choices because they are duplicative.  See, e.g., 
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (consisting only of a citation to Dooley v. 
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901), another of the Insular Cases). 
 71. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 1 (1901). 
 72. Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77, 77–78 (1900). 
 73. Id. §§ 7, 31–32.  Puerto Rico also had a governor appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.  Id. § 17.  The Act’s namesake Senator Joseph Foraker wanted to give 
Puerto Ricans the opportunity to obtain U.S. citizenship, establish an elected legislature, and extend 
the Constitution to Puerto Rico.  SPARROW, supra note 66, at 34–35.  However, Foraker’s fellow 
senators disagreed because they considered the Puerto Ricans “‘illiterate, and unacquainted with 
[American] institutions, and incapable of exercising the rights and privileges guaranteed by the 
Constitution to the States of the Union.’”  Id. 
 74. Downes, 182 U.S. at 244; De Lima, 182 U.S. at 1. 
 75. Downes, 182 U.S. at 247; De Lima, 182 U.S. at 1. 
 76. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 180. 
 77. Id. at  199–200, 217. 
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stretches of time between the acquisition of Territories and their admission into 
the Union.78  However, Downes destroyed the underlying assumption of 
eventual statehood. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court used Downes to clarify the legal 
precedents regarding the nature of Territories.79  To do so, the Supreme Court 
had to determine the meaning of “United States.”80  The Supreme Court 
struggled to reconcile the possible constitutional limitations on the Territory 
Clause with cases like 356 Bales of Cotton, which held that Congress had 
“complete and supreme” power over the Territories.81  Interestingly, the 
Supreme Court discussed Chief Justice Roger Taney’s analysis of the Territory 
Clause in the Dred Scott decision in which he concluded the Territory Clause 
did not permit Congress to establish territorial governments.82  However, the 
Supreme Court found Dred Scott distinguishable from Downes because Dred 
Scott involved the removal of slaves—”property”—from U.S. citizens settling 
in a territory.83  Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined the Constitution 
applied only to “the States whose people united to form the Constitution, and 
such as have since been admitted to the Union upon an equality with them.”84 
Consequently, the Supreme Court articulated the extension doctrine.85  Under 
this doctrine, “the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase 
or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall so direct.”86  The Supreme 
Court first examined instances in which either Congress or treaty terms 
expressly conferred rights to the Territories.87  Then, interpreting the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court distinguished the states of the Union from “any 
place subject to their jurisdiction . . .” (i.e.  Territories).88  Finally, looking at the 
various treaties, the Supreme Court posited there was a period of time between 
annexation and “the proper time [for admission] .  .  .  to the enjoyment of all 
                                                 
 78. See SPARROW, supra note 66, at 3 (noting considerable variations in “ the length of time 
between when an area came under U.S. sovereignty and when Congress admitted it  as a state . . .,” 
with Oklahoma taking 104 years to be admitted). 
 79. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 258 (acknowledging its decisions regarding this issue “ha[d] not 
been altogether harmonious”). 
 80. See id. at  249. 
 81. See id. at  258, 263–67. 
 82. Id. at  250. 
 83. Id. at  274–75. 
 84. Id. at  277. 
 85. STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, T HE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES T ERRITORIES AND 
AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS 116 (1995). 
 86. Downes, 182 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added). 
 87. See, e.g., id. at  254 (reasoning the citizens of the Louisiana Territory were granted 
“ liberty, property, and religion,” not by the Constitution, but rather by the Louisiana Purchase’s 
terms).  See also id. at  269 (agreeing with an earlier decision nullifying the prohibition for jury 
trials in restitution cases in the then-territory of Iowa because Congress, “by express provision and 
by reference, extended the laws of the United States . . .” to Iowa.). 
 88. Id. at  277. 
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rights of citizens of the United States . . . .”89  The Supreme Court asserted that, 
during that period, public opinion, the moral character of Congress, and the 
“principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character” would 
safeguard the Territories.90  It thus regarded disagreement with Congress’s 
decision regarding the acquisition and regulation of a territory as “solely a 
political question.”91 
In his concurrence, Justice White articulated the incorporation doctrine. 92  
Under this doctrine, Congress could regulate a territory without making it part 
of the United States.93  Determining the Constitution’s allocation of powers to 
Congress would properly limit Congress’s power under the Territory Clause,94 
Justice White focused on Congress’s discretion under both the Territory Clause 
and its role in ratifying treaties.95  He believed immediately incorporating the 
Territories into United States upon annexation would deprive the American 
people, through Congress, of their right to determine who should be part of the 
United States.96  Justice White concluded the United States could hold Puerto 
Rico, and by extension the other Territories, as “possession[s]” to which the 
Constitution would not apply.97 
With the Constitution not automatically applicable to the Territories, the 
Supreme Court had to determine what constitutional protections did apply.  In 
1903, the Supreme Court upheld a Hawaiian man’s manslaughter conviction 
even though he was not formally indicted by a grand jury or convicted by a 
unanimous jury because the inclusion of such procedural mechanisms were “not 
                                                 
 89. Id. at  280 (quoting Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement Between the United 
States of America and the Mexican Republic, art . IX, July 8, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo]).  Like the other examples the Court cited, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
expressly protected the liberty, property, and free exercise of religion of the citizens of the ceded 
territory.  Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art . IX.  Chief Justice Fuller had a less rosy picture of this 
intermediate period, claiming Downes permitted Congress to “keep [Puerto Rico] . . . in an 
intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period . . . .”  Downes, 182 U.S. at 372 
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
 90. Downes, 182 U.S. at 280–82, 381.  The Court believed that the “principles of the 
Constitution” (but not the Constitution itself) would protect the citizens of the territories.  Id. at  283 
(emphasis added).  Justice White had a similarly wishy-washy answer.  Id. at  291 (White, J., 
concurring) (“ [E]ven in cases where there is no direct command of the Constitution which applies, 
there may nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, 
although not expressed in so many words in the Constitution.”).  Justice Gray was blunter.  Id. at  
346 (Gray, J, concurring) (“ If Congress is not ready to construct a complete government for the 
conquered territory, it  may establish a temporary government, which is not subject to all the 
restrictions of the Constitution.”). 
 91. Id. at  286. 
 92. Id. at  299 (White, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. (White, J., concurring) 
 94. Id. at  298 (White, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at  310–15 (White, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. at  315 (White, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at  342 (White, J., concurring). 
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fundamental” and their exclusion was “suited to the conditions of the islands, 
and well calculated to conserve the rights of [those Territories’] citizens . . . .”98  
A year later, in Binns v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a licensing fee 
Congress directly imposed on Alaska in a case that only arose because Congress 
did not give Alaska its own legislature.99  The Supreme Court concluded 
Congress did not have to establish a legislature for Alaska because Congress was 
not “limited” to following the Constitution’s model of government when 
establishing territorial governments.100 
By 1922, with Balzac v. Porto Rico, the incorporation doctrine became “the 
settled law of the court.”101  Thus, to determine whether a Puerto Rican man 
accused of libel was entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court looked into whether Congress had incorporated Puerto Rico into 
the Union and thereby extended the Constitution to Puerto Rico.102  The 
Supreme Court concluded Congress did not intend to incorporate Puerto Rico 
when it passed the Jones Act in 1917 because it had granted Puerto Rico a 
separate Bill of Rights.103  Therefore, the Supreme Court held the man was not 
entitled to a jury trial.104 
b. After the Insular Cases: Colonial Calculus in the Granting of 
Constitutional Rights to the Territories 
Since 1922, the Supreme Court has operated on the premise of Balzac: that, 
while regulating the Territories, Congress can grant or withhold rights normally 
guaranteed by the Constitution.105  Consequently, for the Territories, the 
determination of rights has turned into divinations into congressional intent and 
constitutional hairsplitting. 
                                                 
 98. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 208, 217–18 (1903).  See also Dorr v. United States, 
195 U.S. 138, 148–49 (1904) (holding a man convicted of libel in the Philippines was not entitled 
to a trial by jury because Congress did not expressly extend that right to the Filipino legal system).  
But see Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1898) (holding Utah should have given a jury 
trial to a man tried for stealing a calf right before Utah’s admission into the Union and later retried 
after Utah’s admission into the Union because he was constitutionally entitled to one after Utah 
became a state). 
 99. 194 U.S. 486, 492–93, 496 (1904). 
 100. Id. at  491–92.  Cf. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1952) (holding the then-
territory of Alaska could not impose a licensing fee that discriminated against non-residents 
because Congress could choose and did choose to make Alaska subject to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Constitution). 
 101. 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922). 
 102. Id. at  304–06. 
 103. Id. at  306–07. 
 104. Id. at  313–314.  Though the Supreme Court acknowledged that jury trials enabled the 
citizenry to “prevent [the] arbitrary use or abuse” of the justice system, the Supreme Court 
considered it  improper to impose such a system upon people who were “not brought up in a 
fundamentally popular government . . . living in compact and ancient communities, with definitely 
formed customs and political conceptions . . . . “   Id. at  310. 
 105. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5 (1974).  
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In 1974, the Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 
determined the Constitution’s formulation of due process applied to Puerto Rico 
because Congress’s joint resolution approving Puerto Rico’s constitution 
included due process among the provisions of the Constitution applied to Puerto 
Rico.106  Five years later, in Torres v. Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court concluded 
the Fourth Amendment applied to Puerto Rico because Puerto Rico’s 
constitution included a provision using the language of the Fourth 
Amendment.107  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court stated Congress could overrule 
applications of the Constitution that interfered with Congress’s ability to 
regulate the Territories.108 
With Harris v. Rosario in 1980, the Supreme Court placed only the flimsiest 
restraints on Congress’s regulatory power over the Territories.109  Accounting 
for the Territory Clause, the Supreme Court applied rational basis scrutiny to 
Congress’s decision to give less financial assistance to parents in Puerto Rico 
than to parents in the States and upheld that decision.110 
Expanding on Harris, courts have found Congress only needs a rational basis 
for treating Territories differently from the States.  In 1987, the D.C. Circuit in 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day 
Saints v. Hodel held Congress only needs a rational basis for having the 
Secretary of the Interior control and supervise American Samoa’s courts.111  
Two years later, in Virgin Islands v. Dowling, the Third Circuit stated Congress 
would only need a rational basis for permitting the U.S. Virgin Islands to give 
“substantially more severe” sentences for grand larceny than is recommended 
by federal guidelines.112 
In Territories, Congress did not incorporate rights such as citizenship that the 
people in the States take for granted and must be bestowed by Congress or risk 
exclusion.113  In 2013, in Tuaua v. United States, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia dismissed the case of five American Samoans who argued 
Congress’s decision to deny American Samoans U.S. citizenship violated the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114  The court found the 
Citizenship Clause did not apply to Territories and that citizenship was not a 
fundamental right that could be extended to unincorporated Territories such as 
American Samoa absent congressional action.115 
                                                 
 106. Id. 
 107. 442 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1979). 
 108. Id. at  470. 
 109. 446 U.S. 651, 651 (1980). 
 110. Id. at  651–52. 
 111. 830 F.2d 374, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 112. 866 F.2d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 113. See, e.g., Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2013).  
 114. Id. at  94. 
 115. Id. at  94–98; see also Entines v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(holding a Filipino man born when the Philippines was still a U.S. territory did not have birthright 
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Affirming the D.C. District Court’s verdict, the D.C. Circuit tied the 
applicability of constitutional rights to the Territories to the practical concerns 
that arise while regulating them.116  The D.C. Circuit differentiated 
“fundamental” and “non-fundamental” constitutional rights, with the latter 
involving rights “idiosyncratic to the American social compact or to the Anglo-
American tradition of jurisprudence.”117  In respect to “non-fundamental” 
constitutional rights, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[t]he means by which free and 
fair societies may elect to ascribe the classification of citizen must accommodate 
variation where consistent with respect for other, inherent and inalienable, rights 
of persons.”118 
C. Current Congressional Micromanagement in Territorial Affairs as Seen in 
the Territories’ Governing Documents 
Unlike the States, U.S. Territories have organic acts instead of actual 
constitutions.119  Organic acts are statutes that “establish[] an administrative 
agency or local government.”120  Because organic acts are federal statutes, the 
federal government can easily change the territorial governments’ very structure 
by amending the organic acts.121  This fact applies even to Guam’s “Bill of 
Rights,”122 which roughly approximates the Bill of Rights of the U.S. 
Constitution.123 
Congress has designated Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands as 
“unincorporated territor[ies] of the United States” and placed them under the 
                                                 
U.S. citizenship because such citizenship is not a right “ integral to free and fair society” when other 
democratic nations base a person’s citizenship on his/her parent ’s nationality (quoting Tuaua, 788 
F.3d at 308)). 
 116. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 307 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008)).  
 117. Id. at  308. 
 118. Id. at  309.  Because the elected leaders of American Samoa opposed birthright citizenship, 
the D.C. Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs.  Id. at  310. 
 119. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421–1428, 1541–1645 (2012) (referring to the organic act governing Guam 
and to the organic act governing the U.S. Virgin Islands). 
 120. Organic Statute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (stating that organic statutes 
are the same as organic acts). 
 121. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 203–204 (1990) (“By a simple vote of Congress, 
the Organic Act  under which the unincorporated territory exists may be repealed and the limited 
self government which it  enjoys nullified”) (quoting Brief for Government of Virgin Islands, ex 
rel. Godfrey R. de Castro, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 8, Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990) (No. 88-1281)); see Sakamoto v. 
Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1421a); see also 
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special? , 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 733 
(2016) (citing 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421a–b). 
 122. Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 121, at 733. 
 123. 48 U.S.C. § 1421b.  Guam’s Bill of Rights is a mishmash of the U.S. Constitution’s Bill 
of Rights and the limits of Congressional power as stated in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. 
Constitution.  See id. 
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control of the Secretary of the Interior.124  Congress has expressly extended to 
them, among other things, the first nine amendments of the U.S. Constitution, 
the Thirteenth Amendment, and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.125  
Notably, Congress has reserved the right to modify or repeal their laws.126 
Although Puerto Rico and American Samoa have constitutions, there is a 
distinction without a difference between organic acts and territorial 
constitutions, as the Eleventh Circuit has noted Congress may “unilaterally 
repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution . . . and replace [it] with any rules or 
regulations of [Congress’s] choice.”127  The federal government likewise 
believes Puerto Rico’s unique status as a commonwealth did not remove Puerto 
Rico from Congress’s regulatory power.128  The Supreme Court agreed in Puerto 
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, holding Puerto Rico was not a sovereign entity despite its 
commonwealth status because its power originated from the federal government, 
not from the citizens of Puerto Rico.129 
The Eleventh Circuit dicta at least holds true for American Samoa, because 
Congress has reserved the right to amend its constitution.130  No similar 
provision exists in Puerto Rico’s constitution.131  The American Samoan 
constitution, as approved by Congress, vests all “civil, judicial, and military” 
authority in the President of the United States until Congress establishes a formal 
government for American Samoa.132  The President in turn has tasked the 
Secretary of the Interior with the administration of American Samoa.133  Only 
time will tell if the same holds true for Puerto Rico, but the abovementioned 
dicta does not predict a favorable outcome. 
                                                 
 124. Id. §§ 1421a, 1541(a)–(c). 
 125. Id. §§ 1421b(u), 1561. 
 126. Id. §§ 1421c(a), 1574(c). 
 127. United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152–53 (11th Cir. 1993).  But see United States 
v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1034 (1988) (rejecting 
the idea that Puerto Rico was not a sovereign entity because it  found that the Puerto Rican 
government ’s power emanated from the Puerto Rico Constitution). 
 128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–4, Puerto Rico 
v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (No. 15-108). 
 129. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1876. 
 130. 48 U.S.C. § 1662a. 
 131. However, the lack of such a provision likely would not be a hindrance to Congress.  See 
Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879) (“ In the organic act of Dakota there was 
not an express reservation of power in Congress to amend the acts of the territorial legislature, nor 
was it  necessary.  Such a power is an incident of sovereignty, and continues until granted away.”). 
 132. Revised Constitution of American Samoa , AM. SAM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.asb 
ar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1961&Itemid=177 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2018). 
 133. Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6417 (June 29, 1951).  
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D. Recent Challenges to the Territory Clause’s Grant of Plenary Power 
On August 7, 2017, objecting to a petition the Oversight Board had filed to 
protect Puerto Rican assets, various creditors challenged the constitutionality of 
PROMESA by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Puerto Rico.134  Specifically, the creditors argued that the method used to appoint 
the Oversight Board’s members violated the Appointments Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.135  The creditors contended that members of the Oversight Board 
are officers of the United States and therefore their appointment must conform 
to the procedure set out in the Appointments Clause, the Territory Clause 
notwithstanding.136 
The creditors’ argument is not unheard of.137  Professor Lawson proposed a 
similar argument in 1990, only to cast doubt on his argument’s persuasiveness 
in light of the Supreme Court’s willingness to have constitutional limits yield to 
Congress’s plenary regulatory power over the Territories.138 
Such doubt was warranted.  Ultimately, the Puerto Rico District Court held 
the Appointments Clause did not place a limit on Congress’s powers under the 
Territory Clause because longstanding jurisprudence has established that 
Congress can create “governmental institutions for territories that . . . include 
features that would not comport with the requirements of the Constitution if they 
pertained to the governance of the United States.”139  Furthermore, the District 
Court held that, even if the Appointment Clause did place such limits on those 
powers, the Appointments Clause was inapplicable to the Oversight Board 
because the members of the Oversight Board were not officers of the United 
States.140 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROMESA 
PROMESA combines the worst of pre- and post-Spanish-American War 
jurisprudence on the Territory Clause.  PROMESA permits the pre-Spanish-
American War excesses Congress indulged in with the United States’ earlier  
Territories, while maintaining the post-Spanish-American war position that 
permits Congress to experiment with the constitutional rights and protections of 
the Territories to ensure the effective administration thereof. 
                                                 
 134. Objection and Motion of Aurelius to Dismiss T itle III Petition, In re Financial Oversight 
and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 301 F. Supp. 3d 288 (D.P.R. 2017) (No. 17 BK 3283–
LTS). 
 135. Id. at  1–5. 
 136. Id. at  11–17. 
 137. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 33, at 865. 
 138. Id. at  867–870, 874–77. 
 139. In re Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., No. 17 BK 3283-LTS, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 117348, at *12–13, 24 (D.P.R. July 13, 2018). 
 140. Id. at  *26. 
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A. Provisions of PROMESA 
PROMESA is divided into seven titles.141  This Note is primarily concerned 
with Titles I and II, both of which concern the Oversight Board.142  Titles III and 
VI govern the remedies Puerto Rico can seek while creditors file claims against 
it.143 
Title I establishes a seven-person Oversight Board appointed by the President 
of the United States.144  The Oversight Board “provide[s] a method for a covered 
territory to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.”145  
Interestingly, despite backlash regarding language in a previous draft that 
included the other U.S. Territories in PROMESA,146 PROMESA’s definition of 
“territory” includes not only Puerto Rico, but also Guam, the American Samoa, 
the Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.147 
Several times in Title I the Oversight Board is permitted to make decisions 
based on the Oversight Board’s “sole discretion.”148  These decisions range from 
determining which public entities are within the Oversight Board’s purview to 
demanding the territory’s governor develop a separate budget for certain public 
entities.149  In any case, PROMESA expressly prohibits territorial governments 
from “exercis[ing] any control, supervision, oversight, or review over the 
Oversight Board or its activities . . . .”150 
Title II concerns the Oversight Board’s role in the development and 
implementation of fiscal plans and budgets.151  The Oversight Board serves as a 
gatekeeper through the certification process.152  Before the governor submits 
fiscal plans and budgets to the legislature, the Oversight Board must certify 
                                                 
 141. See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 
U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 (2016). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1), (e). 
 145. Id. § 2121(a) (emphasis added). 
 146. PROMESA H.R. 5278, 114th Cong. § 5(20) (2016); Stacey Plaskett, Promesa Bill Passes 
with Revisions in Significant Victory for the U.S. Virgin Islands, Press Release (June 10, 2016), 
https://plaskett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/promesa-bill-passes-revisions-significant-
victory-us-virgin-islands (criticizing PROMESA for imposing “Orwellian oversight boards” and 
failing to provide Puerto Rico and the other territ ories with the means to “grow their own 
economies”). 
 147. 48 U.S.C. § 2104(20)(A)–(E). 
 148. See, e.g., id. § 2121(d)(1)(A)–(E). 
 149. See, e.g., id. 
 150. Id. § 2128(a)(1). 
 151. See generally id. §§ 2141–2152. 
 152. This remains true even in the alternative budget certification process, PROMESA 
provides: The Oversight Board works with the governor and the legislature to jointly develop a 
compliant budget and all parties involved “certify that such budget reflects a consensus among 
them.”  48 U.S.C. § 2142(f). 
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whether those fiscal plans and budgets are compliant.153  If those fiscal plans or 
budgets are not compliant, the Oversight Board sets a deadline by which the 
governor must make the necessary revisions.154  If the governor fails to provide 
the Oversight Board with a compliant fiscal plan or budget, the Oversight Board 
can devise a compliant fiscal plan or budget itself.155 
Once the fiscal plan is established, Title II also requires the governor to submit 
all newly enacted laws to the Oversight Board to ensure the laws are not 
“significantly inconsistent” with the fiscal plan.156  If the Oversight Board 
determines otherwise, the territorial government must revise the law to eliminate 
the inconsistency or give an explanation for the inconsistency the Oversight 
Board finds “reasonable and appropriate.”157  If the territorial government fails 
to do either, Oversight Board can “take such action as it considers necessary . . 
. to ensure that the enactment or enforcement of the law will not adversely affect 
the [territory’s] compliance with the Fiscal Plan, including preventing the 
enforcement or application of the law.”158 
B. Revival of Congressional Micromanagement of the Territories 
As the Supreme Court stated in Binns v. United States, the Territory Clause 
grants Congress great flexibility to structure territorial governments however it 
finds most convenient.159  By creating the Oversight Board, a virtual fourth 
branch of government in Puerto Rico, Congress is utilizing that flexibility as 
proclaimed in PROMESA’s stated constitutional basis.160  Through the 
Oversight Board, Congress can expressly exercise the rights it would reserve for 
itself in an organic act instead of reserving that right by implication.161 
With the procedure for submitting legislative acts to the Oversight Board, 
Congress can exercise its age-old right to nullify territorial legislation, as it could 
do under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and had done in County of 
                                                 
 153. Id. §§ 2141(c)(3), 2142(c).  Fiscal plans are compliant when they, among other things, 
“ensure the funding of essential public services,” “provide adequate funding for public pension 
systems,” “ improve fiscal governance, accountability, and internal controls,” and “ include a debt 
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 154. Id. §§ 2141(a), 2142(a). 
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 156. Id. § 2144(a)(1)–(2). 
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 159. 194 U.S. 486, 491–92 (1904). 
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Yankton.162  Under the Foraker Act, Puerto Rico had to submit to Congress all 
laws enacted by the Puerto Rican legislature, with Congress reserving the right 
to nullify those laws “if deemed advisable.”163  Under Puerto Rico’s constitution, 
a bill becomes law after receiving majority approval from the legislature and the 
governor’s signature.164  However, PROMESA brings back the last step of the 
process in the Foraker Act with the Oversight Board acting in Congress’s stead. 
In addition to outright nullifying laws, the Oversight Board can play the role 
of the territorial legislature as Congress did for Alaska in Binns.165  The only 
difference is the Oversight Board can delegate to the territorial government the 
grunt work of devising the fiscal plans, budgets, and laws.166  The Oversight 
Board is still in control because it not only assesses those items for compliance 
with PROMESA, but also because it can force the Puerto Rican government to 
revise those items to ensure compliance.167  If the territorial government fails to 
ensure compliance, PROMESA unceremoniously cuts out the territorial 
government and enables the Oversight Board to create a compliant budget.168 
C. Excessive Deference to Administrative Concerns that Promote a Lack of 
Accountability and Redress 
In several provisions of PROMESA, Congress effectively codifies the 
congressional capriciousness defended in Mormon Church and lack of redress 
announced in Downes.169 
Similar to how the Supreme Court in Downes made the acquisition of territory 
a political question, Congress expressly prohibits the Puerto Rican government 
from “exercis[ing] any control, supervision, oversight, or review over the 
Oversight Board or its activities . . . .”170  Congress also enables the Oversight 
Board to determine if the Puerto Rican government would be “enact[ing], 
implement[ing], or enforce[ing] any statute, resolution, policy or rule that would 
impair or defeat . . .” PROMESA.171  Finally, Congress frees the Oversight 
                                                 
 162. See id. § 2144(a)(1); Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1879); see 
generally Northwest Ordinance; July 13, 1787 , http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nw 
order.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). 
 163. Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77, § 31 (1900). 
 164. P.R. Const. art . III, §§ 17, 19. 
 165. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 166. See generally 48 U.S.C. § 2144. 
 167. See id. §§ 2142(d)(2), 2144(a)(4)–(5). 
 168. Id. § 2142(d)(2). 
 169. See supra notes 62–65, 92 and accompanying text.  Nonetheless, creditors have attempted 
to collaterally attack the Oversight Board’s decision-making powers by questioning the legitimacy 
of the Oversight Board itself.  See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
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 170. 48 U.S.C. § 2128(a)(1). 
 171. Id. § 2128(a)(2). 
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Board and its members of any liability arising from actions taken in accordance 
with PROMESA’s provisions.172 
Just as Congress in Mormon Church was free to revoke a territorial charter of 
incorporation at any time, so is the Oversight Board often able to act in its “sole 
discretion.”173  The Oversight Board can determine which agencies in Puerto 
Rico need to present a budget to ensure compliance with the fiscal plan and how 
long the Puerto Rican government has to correct the deficiencies it finds in 
proposed fiscal plans.174  The latter is especially significant because if the 
Oversight Board determines the Puerto Rican government has not made those 
corrections, the Oversight Board can simply substitute the proposed fiscal 
plan(s) with a plan it has devised.175 
III. ANALYSIS: PROMESA IS A LOADED WEAPON 
PROMESA illustrates the problem of having only “political substitutes for 
strict self-governance”176 as the U.S. Territories’ safeguards against morally 
dubious congressional action.177  The “general spirit of the Constitution”178 is 
merely a sentimental ideal when the Constitution’s text leaves open the 
effectively unbridled indulgence of the colonial impulse. 
A. PROMESA is the Symptom of the Underlying Problem that is the Territory 
Clause’s Text 
PROMESA shows how weakly benevolence tempers Congress’s prerogative 
under the Territory Clause.  Some requirements of the proposed fiscal plans, 
such as the adequate funding of pensions and public services, suggest 
magnanimity from PROMESA’s drafters.179  Nonetheless, the Oversight Board 
                                                 
 172. Id. § 2125. 
 173. See, e.g., id. § 2121(d)(1)(A)–(D). 
 174. Id. §§ 2121(d)(1)(A)–(D), 2141(a). 
 175. Id. § 2141(d)(2). 
 176. Lawson, supra note 33, at 909.  Unfortunately, Professor Lawson subscribes to the same 
wishy-washiness to which this Note objects.  See id. (advocating for keeping Congress’s broad 
regulatory power but convincing Congress to achieve “substantive goals” consistent with the 
Framers’ intentions via “ free, albeit  formalistically nonbinding, election[s]” of territorial governors 
and “ rubber-stamp” the proposals of territorial “‘legislatures’”). 
 177. “Morally dubious congressional action” is a necessarily awkward turn of phrase.  “Abuse 
of congressional authority” flows better off the tongue, but such a phrase would contradict one of 
this Note’s major arguments: Congress has such broad discretion under the Territory Clause that 
there can be no abuse of that discretion, notwithstanding any limitations implicitly set by the spirit  
of the Constitution.  The only arguments against such broad discretion are those of moral outrage, 
see, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States (Mormon 
Church), 136 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1890) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting), or a challenge to the appointment of 
the Oversight Board members.  Perhaps pragmatism could limit Congress, should the circumstances 
favor a gentle grip from Congress’s iron fist .  However, neither moral outrage nor pragmatism are 
serious legal arguments.  In that sense, this Note begrudgingly agrees with Professor Lawson.  
 178. Id. at  44. 
 179. See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(B)–(C). 
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provisions do not disturb Congress’s discretion concerning the regulation of the 
Territories.180  Moreover, with the Oversight Board able to interfere with the 
enforcement of territorial laws and to scrap fiscal plans and budgets it disagrees 
with, the ugliness of the colonial impulse in the Territory Clause’s text remains 
unconcealed.  Those provisions reveal the illusoriness of Puerto Rico’s freedom 
under PROMESA to choose how to address its debt problems, and the futility of 
appeals to the general spirit of the Constitution to limit the Territory Clause’s 
power grant. 
The colonial impulse has revealed itself in the Oversight Board’s interactions 
with the Puerto Rican government.181  On January 18, 2017, following its 
obligations under PROMESA to consult with the Puerto Rican governor when 
establishing a schedule for developing a fiscal plan,182 the Oversight Board sent 
a letter to Governor Rosselló.183  Though the letter stated the Oversight Board 
was “favorably inclined” to extend the deadline for the submission of the fiscal 
plan,184 it reminded Governor Rosselló of its “sole discretion to . . . change the 
dates of such schedule as it deems appropriate and reasonably feasible.”185  
Exercising that discretion, the Oversight Board made the extension contingent 
on having “no discussion or consideration of short-term liquidity loans or near-
term financings that could restrict fiscal options.”186 
In the same letter, the Oversight Board recommended cutting pensions and 
higher education and healthcare spending.187  The letter appears innocuous 
because of its soft language (“We encourage,” “[W]e recommend . . . .”). 188  
However, the veneer of affability begins to peel off when the Oversight Board 
mentions the fiscal plan must be a “viable fiscal plan that [it] may certify . . .”189 
according to its right under PROMESA.190 
Removing any doubt as to its power, the Oversight Board in February 7, 2017 
said it was willing to use PROMESA’s enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
                                                 
 180. See supra notes 161–168 and accompanying text. 
 181. See Robert Slavin, Puerto Rico Governor Says No to Board’s Austerity Demands, BOND 
BUYER (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/puerto -rico-governor-
says-no-to-boards-austerity-demands-1123404-1.html. 
 182. 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a). 
 183. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R, 
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R. 1 (Jan. 18, 2017) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Carrión I]. 
 184. Id. at  8. 
 185. 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a). 
 186. Carrión I, supra note 183, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. at  5–6.  The Oversight Board reiterated this point during a presentation on January 28, 
2017 in which the Oversight Board said that it  wanted to cut healthcare spending by as much as 
“28%.”  Fiscal Plan Targets Presentation , FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R. (Jan. 28, 2017), 
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 189. Id. at  1. 
 190. 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3). 
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Puerto Rico’s compliance with the desired Fiscal Plan.191  The Oversight Board 
affirmed its willingness to do so in August 30, 2017, when it threatened to stop 
enforcement of a proposed law empowering the Puerto Rican government to 
assist citizens whom health insurance companies had denied coverage because 
the proposed law was significantly inconsistent with the Fiscal Plan approved in 
March 2017.192 
In August 2017, the Oversight Board took the logical next step when it sued 
Governor Rosselló to force compliance with the Fiscal Plan.193  In March 2017, 
the Puerto Rican government had submitted a Fiscal Plan including potential 
furloughs for government employees and teachers,194 in addition to reductions 
in healthcare spending for the 2018 fiscal year by $100 million, and in higher 
education spending by $450 million.195  Nonetheless, in June 2017, after 
reviewing the Puerto Rico’s proposed budget for compliance with the Fiscal 
Plan, the Oversight Board demanded an additional spending cut of $319 million 
to ensure compliance.196  In August 2017, the Oversight Board ordered the 
Puerto Rican government to furlough government employees to save an 
additional $218 million.197  When Governor Rosselló refused, the Oversight 
Board sued him, only to retract the lawsuit and postpone discussion of furloughs 
in the wake of Hurricane Maria.198  Nonetheless, the Oversight Board insisted 
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that the Puerto Rican government not pay Christmas bonuses to government 
employees.199 
On June 29, 2018, the Oversight Board announced that it would devise and 
certify its own Fiscal Plan for the Puerto Rican government for 2019 after the 
Puerto Rican government failed to repeal certain legislation required by the 
Fiscal Plans that the Oversight Board had previously certified.200  The Oversight 
Board’s Fiscal Plan calls for $345 million in spending cuts, including the 
elimination of “the annual $25 million [University of Puerto Rico] scholarship 
fund; and the public-sector Christmas bonus across all government employees 
starting in FY19.”201  After outlining its own version of the Fiscal Plan, the 
Oversight Board warned the Puerto Rican government it would certify its own 
version of the government budget if the Puerto Rican government’s proposed 
budget did not conform with the Fiscal Plan.202 
Tensions escalated when the Puerto Rican government failed to pass a 
conforming budget and tried to have the Oversight Board certify a non-
conforming budget instead.203  When the Oversight Board instead certified and 
imposed its own version of the budget, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico 
sued the Oversight Board.204  The Legislative Assembly challenged the authority 
of the Oversight Board not only to certify budgets but also to impose budgets 
and fiscal plans on the Puerto Rican government.205  It alleged that PROMESA 
limited the Oversight Board to giving “non-binding recommendations” to the 
Puerto Rican government and thus prevented the Oversight Board from 
interfering with the Puerto Rican government’s budgetary power.206  The 
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Legislative Assembly therefore sought: (1) a declaratory judgment stating that 
the Oversight Board could only provide non-binding recommendations to the 
Puerto Rican government, and (2) an order nullifying the Oversight Board’s 
budget and compelling the Oversight Board to certify the government’s non-
conforming budget.207 
However, on August 7, 2018, the Puerto Rico District Court ruled in favor of 
the Oversight Board.208  First, the court denied the Legislative Assembly’s 
request for an order compelling certification of the government’s proposed 
budget because PROMESA precluded judicial review of the Oversight Board’s 
determinations on the compliance of budgets and fiscal plans.209  Second, the 
court denied the Legislative Assembly’s request for a declaratory judgment 
limiting the Oversight Board’s powers to offering non-binding 
recommendations because PROMESA explicitly pre-empted any territorial laws 
inconsistent with it and allowed the Oversight Board to “render certified budgets 
effective by operation of law . . .” despite objections from the Puerto Rican 
government.210 
B. The Failure to Resolve the Tension Only Enables More PROMESA-like 
Laws to be Passed 
In light of the precedents regarding the Territory Clause, PROMESA is 
disconcerting not because Congress passed it, but because Congress can pass 
similar laws in the future.  Congress has not given Puerto Rico or the other 
Territories an equivalent of the Tenth Amendment to prevent encroachment by 
the federal government.211  Because the rights of the Territories are only those 
Congress has bestowed upon the Territories, the Territories’ only safeguards 
from PROMESA are time and politics, as has been the case since the Northwest 
Ordinance.  Currently, PROMESA’s definition of “territory” does not foreclose 
the ability of Congress to impose Oversight Boards upon the other Territories.212 
Keenly aware of this possibility, U.S. Virgin Islands officials in November 
2016 had to assure constituents the territory’s own debt problems were not 
severe enough to warrant an Oversight Board after the legislature passed a 
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spending bill that narrowly averted a government shutdown.213  Nonetheless, the 
possibility of an Oversight Board for the U.S. Virgin Islands has not been ruled 
out because the U.S. Virgin Islands has more debt-per-capita than Puerto Rico 
and “rating agencies downgraded its debt to ‘junk’ status in December 
[2016].”214  In fact, a coalition of U.S. Virgin Island business organizations has 
warned that a “‘PROMESA event’” will occur in the U.S. Virgin Islands if the 
territory’s economic wellbeing does not improve.215  Talk of a “VIOMESA” 
arose again after Hurricanes Irma and Maria forced the legislature of the U.S. 
Virgin Islands to contemplate a budget shortfall of over $200 million even with 
disaster loans.216 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the latest manifestation of the colonial impulse enabled by the Territory 
Clause and the jurisprudence regarding it, PROMESA highlights a part of the 
Constitution that runs counter to the United States’ democratic values.  
PROMESA combines the nigh-limitless regulatory power of Congress over the 
U.S. Territories in the 19th century and earlier 20th century with the modern 
rationale of flexible governance to strip Puerto Rico of its autonomy.  In the 
process, PROMESA shows the extent of the U.S. Territories’ dependence on the 
benevolence of Congress for their system of government, their legislation, and 
even the extension of constitutional protections that the citizens of the States of 
the Union take for granted.  PROMESA is no exceptional horror, and that fact 
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